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 Chapter 10 
 Planning and the Control of Action 
 Frank  Wieber and  Peter  M.  Gollwitzer 
 Planning has been found to have a powerful effect on human actions (e.g., Gollwitzer 
& Sheeran,  2006 ). But how do people plan? In this chapter we fi rst introduce imple-
mentation intentions (e.g., Gollwitzer,  1999 ) as an effi cient way of planning. 
Implementation intentions refer to specifi c plans in which individuals and groups 
can specify when, where, and how they intend to act using an if-then format (e.g., 
“If I come home from work on Fridays, then I will immediately put on my jogging 
shoes and go for a 30-minute run!”). After we examine how they support goal pur-
suit, we differentiate between spontaneous and strategic planning—two ways in 
which if–then plans can be made on the basis of goal-related knowledge. 
 With respect to spontaneous planning, we highlight the importance of the acces-
sibility of goal-related knowledge. We introduce goal systems theory (Kruglanski, 
Shah, Fishbach, Friedman, Chun, & Sleeth-Keppler,  2002 ) as a conceptual frame-
work because it addresses the question of how goals can increase the accessibility 
of knowledge about when, where, and how to pursue the goal. To illustrate how the 
accessibility of goal-related knowledge facilitates goal attainment, we discuss a set 
of recent studies. They show that individuals spontaneously grasp goal-relevant 
information in the form of implementation intentions (Marquardt, Tröger, Wieber, 
& Gollwitzer,  2016 ; see also Marquardt,  2011 ) even if it is incidentally provided in 
their environment and that they use this knowledge to improve their goal attainment 
without being prompted to do so. 
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 Regarding strategic planning, we argue that individuals’ knowledge about their 
goals, potential obstacles during goal pursuit, and effective goal-directed actions is 
central to devising effective plans and to the successful control of action. We intro-
duce Mental Contrasting with Implementation Intentions (MCII; Oettingen, 
Wittchen, & Gollwitzer,  2013 ; Oettingen,  2014 ) as an effective self-regulation strat-
egy with which to systematize the selection of goal-relevant knowledge and the 
translation of that knowledge into if–then plans. In this chapter we discuss a recent 
experimental study suggesting that such strategic planning is very useful in unstruc-
tured situational contexts that require identifi cation and selection of appropriate 
goal-relevant knowledge. We further suggest that strategic planning is less useful in 
structured situational contexts that prompt the goal-directed actions without requir-
ing any knowledge about advantageous opportunities to act and about potential 
obstacles (Sailer et al.,  2015 ). We conclude by emphasizing how useful spontaneous 
and strategic planning is for transforming individuals’ goal-related knowledge into 
action. 
 Controlling Actions by Goals and Implementation Intentions 
 In the psychology of action (e.g., Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, & Sears,  1944 ; 
Gollwitzer & Bargh,  1996 ), two phenomena are thought to be relevant to goal pur-
suit: goal-setting and goal-striving. They are governed by different principles. Goal- 
setting is concerned with the choice of a desired end state for which to strive (What 
is being pursued?); goal-striving is associated with moving toward the desired end 
state (How is the goal being pursued?). Goals are thereby defi ned as desired end 
states that people intend to attain and to which they commit themselves (Gollwitzer 
& Oettingen,  2012 ). For individuals to commit themselves fi rmly to a goal, they 
must perceive it as highly desirable and feasible. These assessments are based on an 
individual’s knowledge about a potential pursuit of the goal. Knowing that sunny 
weather has been forecast and having no commitments for the coming weekend, for 
example, one might judge a weekend trip to a nearby national park as both desirable 
and feasible and might consequently commit oneself to the goal of going on a week-
end trip to that place. 
 Nonetheless, even when individuals have strongly pledged themselves to a goal, 
such commitment does not guarantee successful goal attainment. This fact is 
referred to as the intention–behavior gap (e.g., Sheeran,  2002 ). In a meta-analysis 
by Webb and Sheeran ( 2006 ), for instance, a moderate-to-large change ( d = 0.66) in 
the strength of individuals’ intentions resulted in only a small-to-moderate change 
in the individuals’ behavior ( d = 0.36). In considering why the transition of one’s 
intention into goal-directed actions might fail, researchers (e.g., Gollwitzer & 
Sheeran,  2006 ) have identifi ed several typical problems that have to be overcome 
during goal-striving. People must start acting on a goal, persist or even intensify 
their efforts in the face of diffi culties or obstacles, shield their goal from interfer-
ences or distractions, abandon ineffective means or even the goal itself if it becomes 
F. Wieber and P.M. Gollwitzer
171
obviously unattainable, and economize on their limited resources to self-regulate 
their actions. Knowledge about the when, where, and how of striving toward a goal 
is necessary, but not suffi cient, for successfully attaining it. Even when individuals 
know how to pursue a goal, they might struggle to turn their knowledge into goal- 
directed actions. Strategies that allow effective regulation of one’s thoughts, feel-
ings, and actions during goal-striving are needed. One time- and cost-effi cient 
strategy to promote individuals’ goal-striving is to devise implementation intentions 
for planning when, where, and how one intends to act (Gollwitzer,  1993 ,  1999 , 
 2014 ; overview by Wieber, Thürmer, & Gollwitzer,  2015b ). In implementation 
intentions, people specify a well-suited or critical future situation and link an adap-
tive goal-directed response to it in an if–then format. For example, aa person intend-
ing to learn a new language might opt for one of the following implementation 
intentions: “If I am fi nished eating my Sunday morning breakfast, then I will work 
through one lecture of the language course on my computer,” or “If ‘New E-mail’ 
notifi cations pop up while I am working on the language course on my computer, 
then I will ignore them.” 
 What is so special about such simple if–then plans? Researchers studying the 
processes underlying the effects of implementation intentions have systematically 
tried to answer to this question. Essentially, implementation intentions are at the 
junction of controlled and automatic processes (e.g., Evans,  2008 ; Strack & Deutsch, 
 2004 ). The intentional formation of if–then plans typically emerges from delibera-
tion on when, where, and how to act. By contrast, the implementation of goal- 
directed action in response to an existing, specifi ed, critical situation entails features 
of automaticity (e.g., Bargh,  1994 ): Effects of implementation intentions have been 
observed to be immediate and effi cient, and once the specifi ed situation is encoun-
tered they come about without requiring extensive deliberation on how to respond 
(e.g., Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & Midden,  1999 ; Webb & Sheeran,  2007 ,  2008 ; Wieber 
& Sassenberg,  2006 ). 
 Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that forming implementation intentions in 
addition to mere goals leads to faster responses to critical situations (e.g., Parks- 
Stamm, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen,  2007 ) and improved performance in a secondary 
task without compromising the simultaneous performance in a primary task (i.e., 
speed-up effects are still evident under high cognitive load; e.g., Brandstätter, 
Lengfelder, & Gollwitzer,  2001 ). This research also suggests that there is no need 
for a further conscious intent to act in a critical moment. For instance, Bayer, 
Achtziger, Gollwitzer, and Moskowitz ( 2009 ) found that implementation inten-
tions encouraged successful pursuit of a goal even when the critical cue was pre-
sented subliminally, that is, when it was not consciously recognized. Moreover, 
studies of the human brain have found evidence that implementation intentions 
change action control from slow top-down to fast bottom-up processes (e.g., 
Gilbert, Gollwitzer, Cohen, Oettingen, & Burgess,  2009 ; Schweiger Gallo, Keil, 
McCulloch, Rockstroh, & Gollwitzer,  2009 ; Hallam et al.,  2015 ). In summary, 
implementation intentions strategically automate the control of goal-directed 
actions, instantly and effi ciently activating the action response linked to a critical 
situation when the individual enters it. 
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 The Role of Knowledge Accessibility in Planning 
and in the Control of Action 
 To assist the individual’s pursuit of a goal effectively, implementation intentions 
need to specify relevant critical situations in the if-component and instrumental 
responses in the then-component (see also Gollwitzer, Wieber, Myers, & McCrea, 
 2009 ). Prior studies have generally observed that people can indeed identify and 
self-select suitable situations and responses (e.g., Adriaanse, de Ridder, & de Wit, 
 2009 ; Gollwitzer & Brandstätter,  1997 ). In fact, both experimenter-provided and 
self-generated implementation intentions have been shown to foster goal attainment 
effectively (Armitage,  2009 ). But how do people generate effective plans? 
 Individuals have to access goal-relevant knowledge before they can further pro-
cess this information. Generally, psychological research shows wide agreement that 
knowledge accessibility is important for individuals’ cognition and behavior (over-
view by Wyer,  2008 ). As for the accessibility of goal-related knowledge, goal sys-
tems theory (Kruglanski et al.,  2002 ) affords a helpful conceptual framework for 
understanding how pursuing a goal affects the accessibility and application of 
knowledge that is relevant to planning. This theory rests on a cognitive approach to 
motivation. Its proponents apply a network conceptualization that allows for 
dynamic and malleable modeling of the activation and permits application of cogni-
tive content to motivation content. Within this “motivation-as-cognition” approach, 
goal systems are defi ned as “the mental representations of motivational networks 
composed of interconnected goals and means” (Kruglanski et al.,  2002 , p. 333). 
Given this connectedness of goals and means, the activation of a mental representa-
tion of a goal should also activate the mental representation of suitable means to 
pursue this goal. When this idea is applied to planning, it follows that when one is 
pursuing a goal (e.g., to prepare a healthy dinner), knowledge of possible means that 
is relevant to planning the when, where, and how of goal-striving becomes easily 
accessible (e.g., thinking of the salad in one’s fridge and of the tomatoes that one 
has to purchase on the way home). 
 Two properties of the interconnections are thus especially interesting for the acti-
vation of goal-relevant knowledge: structure and strength. As far as the structure of 
the interconnections are concerned, the number of means that are attached to a goal 
can vary. For one person, activating the physical fi tness goal might activate only the 
means of going to the gym, but for another person it might activate a multitude of 
means (e.g., going to the gym, riding a bike to work, and taking the stairs). In addi-
tion to such interindividual differences, the number of means connected to a goal 
might also vary from one goal to the next. For instance, there might be numerous 
ways to pursue the goal of eating healthily (e.g., eating at least fi ve portions of fruit 
and vegetables a day, drinking water rather than soft drinks) but only a few ways to 
pursue the goal of acquiring a driver’s license (i.e., taking the offi cial test). 
Concerning the strength of the interconnections, one may expect the strength of the 
cognitive association between the goal and the means for achieving it to be stronger 
when the number of those means is relatively low than when it is relatively high. 
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Going to the gym will probably be more likely to come to one’s mind if it is the only 
means rather than one of several that are connected to one’s physical fi tness goal. In 
summary, the structure and strength of the goal–means interconnections relating to 
a given goal seem relevant to planning because the activation of knowledge about 
potential means is a starting point for individual planning. Thus, the activation of 
the goal should ease the access to the knowledge relevant to the when and where 
(the if-component) and to the how (the then-component) of implementing that goal. 
 Spontaneous Use of Incidentally Presented Goal-Relevant 
Information 
 Given the importance of accessibility, one might wonder whether incidental knowl-
edge that is offered in an external context is also used by individuals to support their 
pursuit of a goal. In other words, are individuals capable of grasping goal-relevant 
knowledge about suitable opportunities, potential obstacles, and instrumental action 
strategies without much conscious effort? 
 Studies by Marquardt et al. ( 2016 ) addressed this question. They tested whether 
incidentally furnished goal-relevant information favors subsequent goal attainment. 
Moreover, they investigated whether the spontaneous use of incidentally provided 
implementation intentions depends on the activation of the particular goal. The 
authors expected that individuals would make spontaneous use of incidentally pro-
vided implementation intentions—but only when the goal had been previously 
activated. 
 Marquardt et al. ( 2016 ) fi rst examined whether incidentally communicated plans 
can promote high school students’ achievement in a school setting. Initially, the 
researchers implicitly activated the achievement goal of the participating students 
by having them work on a crossword puzzle containing either achievement-related 
words (achievement-goal condition) or neutral words (no achievement-goal-control 
condition). Priming the goal rather than asking individuals to set the goal them-
selves was intended to reduce the likelihood that they would try to plan consciously. 
To induce spontaneous implementation intention, all students in the study com-
pleted on paper a puzzle about sentence construction. It presented 34 sentence frag-
ments in scrambled order. The task of the students was to (a) form six meaningful 
sentences by connecting the fragments and (b) write down these sentences. All six 
sentences had been composed as conditional phrases (if–then structure). The only 
difference between the intention conditions was that one of the six sentences in the 
implementation-intention condition was relevant to the subsequent creativity task 
(“If I have found a use, then I will instantly search for the next use.”), whereas none 
of the six sentences in the no-achievement-goal condition and the mere- achievement- 
goal condition were relevant to the subsequent creativity task. 
 Students then worked on an ostensibly unrelated alternative- uses task (Guilford, 
 1967 ), in which they had to write down as many different ways of using a matchbox 
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as possible. The number of different ways that students came up with was used to 
measure the effects of the manipulations of the goal and the plan. The results showed 
that participants in the achievement-goal-plus-implementation-intention condition 
found more uses for a matchbox than did the participants in the mere-achievement- 
goal and no-achievement-goal-control conditions. Thus, giving goal-relevant infor-
mation (i.e., the implementation intention) improved goal attainment even when the 
information was delivered incidentally (i.e., before participants knew that it consti-
tuted an effective planning strategy for performing well on a later task). These fi nd-
ings tentatively bear out our argument that people can spontaneously use goal-related 
knowledge to bolster their goal attainment. 
 To corroborate these fi ndings, Marquardt et al. ( 2016 ) ran a second study on the 
spontaneous use of goal-relevant knowledge. This time, the degree to which the 
individuals’ healthy-diet goal benefi ted from incidentally shared plans to eat health-
ily was tested in a university cafeteria. The study was divided into two parts. The 
fi rst part took place in the morning and served to manipulate participants’ goal to eat 
healthily. Participants either read a short text of evidence-based arguments for a bal-
anced diet with fi ve portions of fruits and vegetables a day (healthy-diet goal condi-
tion) or a neutral text on nutrition science in Germany (no-goal-control condition), 
which was approximately the same length and had no words related to the healthy- 
diet goal. 
 Below the goal manipulation texts, a graphical display was positioned on the 
information sheet. This display was used to manipulate the incidentally offered 
plan. In all three conditions—no-healthy-diet-goal-control (A), mere-healthy-diet- 
goal (B), and mere-healthy-diet-goal-plus-implementation-intention (C)—partici-
pants received pictorial information on how to act on the healthy-diet goal. The 
graphical display consisted of three photographs showing the cafeteria’s salad bar, 
the vegetable bar, and the fruit shelf (each seen from the perspective of an individual 
standing directly in front it). All participants therefore had identical information on 
the how of eating healthily at the cafeteria. However, only participants in condition 
C received two additional pieces of information. First, to the left of the three photo-
graphs, the participants saw one photograph of the cafeteria entrance. This image 
thus depicted a suitable opportunity for them to act on their healthy-diet goal and 
can be thought of as specifying the if-component of an implementation intention. 
Second, they saw an arrow pointing from the picture of the cafeteria entrance to the 
three photographs of the suitable responses (i.e., selecting salad, fruit, and/or vege-
tables). The arrow thereby connected the different pictures and was an equivalent to 
the link between the if-component and the then-component in verbal implementa-
tion intentions. In summary, participants in condition C received information on the 
how of goal pursuit (photographs of the salad bar, the vegetable bar, and the fruit 
shelf), the when and where (picture of the cafeteria entrance), and a graphical link 
between the pictures that implied the characteristic structure of the if–then 
condition. 
 The second part of the experiment took place during lunch time. Participants 
completed a questionnaire after they had fi nished their meal at the cafeteria. They 
indicated how many portions of salad, vegetables, and fruit they had consumed 
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there on which day. The total sum was used to measure the effects that the goal and 
plan manipulation had on the diet of the participants. Participants in condition C 
consumed a greater quantity and variety of healthy foods than did participants in 
either condition A or B. Thus, passing on if–then information that was relevant to 
planning improved goal attainment even when this information came incidentally 
(in this case, through a graphical display). 
 Together, these fi ndings further underline the importance of knowledge accessi-
bility for individuals’ goal pursuits. People readily used their newly acquired goal- 
related knowledge to conceive if–then plans for their goal attainment spontaneously. 
In our view, such spontaneous planning highlights the fact that automatic processes 
can be instrumental in the adaptive control of action. It is, however, important to 
note that the spontaneous planning occurred on the basis of an activated goal, fur-
ther indicating that effects of implementation intention depend on the activation of 
a superordinate goal (Sheeran, Webb, & Gollwitzer,  2005 ). 
 Strategic Use of Goal-Relevant Knowledge with MCII 
 The use of goal intentions to guide action is aided by the coactivation of means 
associated with a goal. However, identifying and forming effective if–then plans 
might vary in diffi culty, depending on the individual, the situation, and the specifi c 
goal. It may well be that neither the automatic activation of goal-related knowledge 
nor the spontaneous acquisition and use of incidentally presented goal-relevant 
information is enough to guide individuals’ actions successfully when pursuing the 
goal is diffi cult (e.g., when that pursuit is cognitively or motivationally demanding). 
A goal can be diffi cult for reasons related to the individual, such as internal obsta-
cles (e.g., ego control or procrastination; see Gollwitzer, Bayer, & McCulloch, 
 2005 ; Wieber & Gollwitzer,  2010 ,  in press ). Or it may be diffi cult because of the 
situation, that is, because of external obstacles (e.g., distractions; see Wieber, von 
Suchodoletz, Heikamp, Trommsdorff, & Gollwitzer,  2011 ). Whatever the case, 
individuals must carefully select the action they include in the if- and then- 
components of their implementation intentions. Depending on the goal at hand and 
on the existing ideas about goals and means, individuals might either narrow their 
focus to fewer situations and responses or extend the range of situations and 
responses they take into account when pursuing their goal. If people experience 
problems with sticking to a healthy diet when watching TV in the evening, they 
might want to address this situation specifi cally. Or when people experience prob-
lems with recognizing opportunities to exercise, they might want to expand the situ-
ations and means connected to their physical fi tness goal. 
 A systematic guide to planning would be helpful for such challenging goal pur-
suit, and that guide exists—the preparation of if–then planning by means of mental 
contrasting (e.g., Oettingen et al.,  2009 ; Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter,  2001 ; for 
summaries see Oettingen,  2012 ,  2014 ). Mental contrasting brings individuals to 
actively search through their goal-relevant knowledge and select or even derive 
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critical situations and suitable responses. In the application of the strategy, individu-
als are asked to formulate a personal wish, to imagine positive future outcomes of 
realizing that wish, and to mentally contrast these outcomes with current potential 
obstacles to their goal-striving. Mental contrasting thereby increases the accessibil-
ity of both a positive future vision and the current reality, instilling a sense that 
action is necessary. Moreover, mental contrasting is thought to activate relevant 
expectations that allow for an adjustment of personal goal commitment (a person’s 
attachment to a goal or the decisiveness to reach it; Locke, Latham, & Erez,  1988 ). 
If the expectation of reaching the desired outcome is high, commitment is strength-
ened by mental contrasting; if it is low and effort might be in vain, commitment is 
weakened and individuals disengage. 
 In the next step, MCII guides individuals in using this knowledge of potential 
obstacles and in detecting instrumental responses to each of them. Corroborating 
the effectiveness of combining mental contrasting and implementation intentions, 
one study found that MCII participants reported greater success at reducing their 
unhealthy snacking consumption than did participants who used either only mental 
contrasting or only implementation intentions (Study 2 in Adriaanse et al.,  2010 ). 
According to this line of thought, MCII is likeliest to contribute to one’s goal attain-
ment when the strategic search for one’s goal-relevant knowledge and planning can 
make a difference. MCII is less likely to do so when one’s environment prompts the 
when, where, and how of goal-directed actions to begin with. 
 One study by Sailer et al. ( 2015 ) addresses this argument. The authors ran an 
MCII intervention study on physical exercise in a clinical context. Previous research 
had indicated that regular exercise can have positive effects on both the physical and 
mental health of persons with schizophrenia. However, shortcomings in cognition, 
perception, affect, and volition make it especially diffi cult for people with schizo-
phrenia to plan a behavior and follow through on it. As a result, studies that had 
incorporated exercise reported poor attendance and high drop-out rates, indicating 
that schizophrenic patients were not able to overcome the manifold barriers to phys-
ical activity. Sailer et al. therefore tested whether MCII helps convert schizophrenic 
individuals’ exercise intentions into behavior while taking into account the support-
iveness of the situational context. 
 The patients diagnosed with a schizophrenic spectrum disorder lived in either an 
autonomy-focused setting (a self-supply ward with daytime care by nurses, medical 
doctors, and psychologists) or a highly structured setting (a ward providing intense 
therapy to activate patients and affording continuous availability of psychiatric 
care). Whereas participants in the autonomy-focused setting had to manage attend-
ing the exercise groups on their own, those in the highly structured setting were 
actively reminded and invited to each exercise session. The authors predicted that 
engaging in MCII would help individuals attain their exercise goals in the autonomy- 
focused setting (in which each search and application of goal-relevant knowledge 
depended on the patients themselves) but not in the highly structured setting (in 
which the environment made the relevant information available in order to prompt 
the goal-directed actions). To test this prediction, participants who agreed to partici-
pate in the study were randomly assigned to an information-plus-goal-intention 
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condition (control group) or an information-plus-MCII condition (MCII group). 
Patients in the control group read a nonfi ction text on the benefi ts of physical activ-
ity and on potential obstacles for which one must prepare (e.g., motivational prob-
lems and tiredness). They then set the goal to attend jogging sessions and wrote it 
down. Patients in the MCII group read the same nonfi ction text and then worked 
through the MCII strategy, listing three positive outcomes associated with attending 
the exercise session (e.g., losing weight) and three obstacles (e.g., feeling tired). 
Next, they identifi ed their most important obstacle and, with their therapist, worked 
out a specifi c solution to this obstacle before translating it into an implementation 
intention in the if–then format: “If [obstacle], then I will [response].” In both groups 
participants were treated by a trained therapist during individual training sessions 
that involved an equal amount of contact between the therapist and each of the 
patients. 
 The attendance and persistence of the patients in the exercise program of the 
participating clinics during the 4 weeks after their treatment was measured as the 
dependent variable. In both the autonomy-focused and the highly structured setting, 
two jogging sessions were scheduled every week and did not confl ict with therapies 
or other events. During jogging sessions, participants could run at their own pace 
and decide how long they wanted to run. Results in the highly structured setting 
showed that MCII and control participants alike attended about 70 % of the offered 
exercise sessions. In the autonomy-focused setting, however, control participants 
attended less than 40 % of the sessions, whereas the MCII participants continued 
attending about 70 % of them. When it comes to successful goal attainment, these 
fi ndings demonstrate the importance of self-regulating one’s goal pursuits and goal- 
striving in rather unstructured situations. When goal-directed actions were prompted 
contextually, MCII did not improve goal attainment, for it was already rather high. 
But when goal-related knowledge mattered because remembering and initiating the 
goal-directed actions was up to individuals, MCII did improve goal attainment. 
These fi ndings imply that the MCII self-regulation strategy constitutes a time- and 
cost-effi cient action-control tool that helps patients with severe mental illness (see 
also Toli, Webb, & Hardy,  2016 ) to achieve their health-related goals in an autono-
mous setting. 
 Strategic Planning of the Automatic Activation of Goal-Relevant 
Knowledge 
 In addition to the spontaneous and strategic planning described above, planning 
with implementation intentions can also be benefi cial as a context-sensitive reminder 
of one’s strategies or goals that supports refl ective decision making and goal- 
directed actions. This strategic use of the automatic effects of planning with imple-
mentation intentions is related to the demands that have been postulated for 
human-centered computer systems in information management. The aim in the 
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interaction between humans and computers in sociotechnical systems is to commu-
nicate the right information at the right time and the right place in the right way to 
the right person in order to empower that person to fi nd and select the best goal- 
directed response (e.g., Fischer,  2012 ). Implementation intentions might also be 
used to achieve this end. 
 First, implementation intentions provide the relevant information about instru-
mental action responses in critical situations during goal pursuit. In a study on group 
decision-making (Thürmer, Wieber, & Gollwitzer,  2015a ,  2015b ), participants set 
themselves the goal of performing well. In keeping with this goal, they then either 
generated the specifi c goal of reviewing the advantages of the nonpreferred alterna-
tives before making a group decision (control condition) or included this strategy in 
the implementation intention: “And when we fi nally take the decision sheet to note 
our preferred alternative, then we will go over the advantages of the non-preferred 
alternatives again” (Thürmer et al.,  2015a , p. 104). As a result of this small differ-
ence in planning, implementation-intention groups succeeded more often than mere 
goal-intention groups at transforming their respective intentions into actions and 
thereby improving their goal attainment. Apparently, implementation intentions 
provided the strategy information to the group members just before the group deci-
sion was taken and thereby oriented them in their search for the best solution to the 
issue on which they were about to decide. 
 Second, implementation intentions have also been found to be capable of activat-
ing one’s goal at a critical juncture and thereby increasing the impact of this goal on 
individuals’ cognition and behavior (van Koningsbruggen, Stroebe, Papies, & Aarts, 
 2011 ). In a study on dieting, unsuccessful dieters either formed a think-of-dieting 
implementation intention (“The next time that I am tempted to eat chocolate [cook-
ies, pizza, French fries, or chips], then I will think of dieting”) or just indicated why 
it was important for them to resist the temptation to eat chocolate [cookies, pizza, 
French fries, or chips]. In a subsequent word-completion task, participants in the 
implementation-intention condition were instructed to fi ll in unfi nished words (e.g., 
_ij_e_) that were preceded by one of the fi ve food cues (e.g., chocolate). In complet-
ing the task, they used diet-related words (e.g.,  lijnen , Dutch for dieting) instead of 
neutral words (e.g.,  tijger , Dutch for tiger) more often than control participants did. 
Evidently, implementation intentions reminded individuals of their dieting goal 
when they encountered a tempting situation (Study 1) and thus empowered unsuc-
cessful dieters to reduce their consumption of palatable foods (Study 2). Together, 
the fi ndings of these studies (Thürmer et al.,  2015a ,  2015b ; van Koningsbruggen 
et al.,  2011 ; see also Wieber, Thürmer, & Gollwitzer,  2015a ) demonstrate that stra-
tegic automation of action control by planning with implementation intentions can 
serve goal attainment even when a refl ective decision needs to be made or when 
individuals are not aware of instrumental action strategies at the time of planning. 
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 Conclusion and Outlook 
 In this chapter we have examined the role that knowledge has in planning and 
action control. We have stressed that knowing which goal one intends to pursue 
and committing oneself to that goal are often only the fi rst step toward successful 
goal attainment. Planning when, where, and how to act with implementation 
intentions has proven to be an effective self-regulation strategy for reducing this 
intention–behavior gap. Regarding the acquisition and use of plan-relevant 
knowledge, we have argued that individuals have a variety of ways to form 
implementation intentions. They range from spontaneous planning of how to 
approach a goal on the basis of accessible goal-related knowledge to strategic 
planning that includes a systematic search of knowledge for critical situations 
and instrumental action responses. 
 With respect to spontaneous planning, we have argued that the activation of a 
goal coactivates goal-relevant knowledge and thus greatly facilitates the decision 
on when, where, and how to pursue the goal. Although this automatic coactivation 
is likely to be an adaptive mechanism that promotes successful control of action 
most of the time, it can also hinder behavioral change. For instance, having the 
goal of getting to work might automatically induce one to take the car rather than 
use public transport, even if one intends to adopt a sustainable lifestyle (e.g., 
Bamberg,  2000 ). In that sense, strategic planning is a powerful self-regulatory 
tool informing behavioral change. In fact, authors of meta-analyses of effects that 
implementation intention has on physical activity (Bélanger-Gravel, Godin, & 
Amireault,  2013 ) and eating behavior (Adriaanse, Vinkers, de Ridder, Hox, & de 
Wit,  2011 ) found that implementation intentions successfully aid the translation 
of individuals’ intentions into action. The strategic automation of action control 
by implementation intentions has even been found to remind the individual of a 
useful refl ective strategy (Thürmer et al.,  2015a ), to reinforce one’s goal in a criti-
cal situation (van Koningsbruggen et al.,  2011 ), or to foster the restructuring of 
automatic goal–means connections that are required to change habitual behavior 
(e.g., Adriaanse, Gollwitzer, de Ridder, de Wit, & Kroese,  2011 ). Combining 
mental contrasting and implementation intentions in order to extend planning has 
proven more effective than either mental contrasting or implementation intentions 
alone (Study 2 in Adriaanse et al.,  2010 ). Hence, strategic planning with MCII 
appears to be an especially effective tool for encouraging individuals to make 
effective use of their goal-relevant knowledge and thus improve the attainment of 
their goals. In summary, the planning research we have presented in this chapter 
highlights the adaptive role of spontaneous and strategic planning in turning an 
individual’s knowledge into action. 
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